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CLICK, DOWNLOAD, CAUSATION: A CALL FOR
UNIFORMITY AND FAIRNESS IN AWARDING
RESTITUTION TO THOSE VICTIMIZED BY
POSSESSORS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Katherine M Giblin+
The presence of child pornographyl on the Internet is astoundingly prolific. 2
These explicit materials permeate websites, virtual communities, and
peer-to-peer networks.3  With its effortless accessibility and anonymous
interface, the Internet serves as an ideal gateway for the expedited circulation
+ J.D. candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., Loyola University Maryland. I would like to thank my family and friends for their love and
support. I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to Professor Mary Graw Leary for her
invaluable guidance. I recognize that this Comment touches upon the very personal and upsetting
realities experienced by victims of child pornography, and my heart genuinely goes out them as
they strive to move forward.
1. The federal definition of child pornography encompasses:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture . .. of sexually explicit conduct, where-
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated
image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006). Further, "'sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated-(i)
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether
between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person."
Id. § 2256(2)(A).
2. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-757T, FILE SHARING PROGRAMS:
USERS OF PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS CAN READILY ACCESS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 4 (2004)
(noting that the expansion and availability of the Internet and its correlative technologies "have
led to a proliferation of child pornography on the Internet").
3. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 6, 15 (noting that
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing programs facilitate user interaction to allow for the sharing of
information; such programs are "emerging as a conduit for the sharing of pornographic images
and videos, including child pomography"); MAx TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 130-47 (2003) (discussing the role of virtual communities
in conjunction with the spread of child pornography); Pornography Industry Is Larger than the
Revenues of the Top Technology, CY.TALK NEWSBLOG (Jan. 1, 2010),
http://blog.cytalk.com/2010/01/web-porn-revenuel (announcing that at least one-hundred
thousand websites showcase images of child pornography).
1109
Catholic University Law Review
of massive quantities of child pornography. Worse yet, as the Internet's
convenience facilitates the child-pornography market, it correspondingly fuels
the perpetual victimization of the depicted children.
A significant amount of disseminated pornographic materials exhibit
documented childhood abuse. As one attorney emphasized, many of these
images are not just "l3-year-olds in bras or sexting or 17-year-old girls gone
wild-these are kids who are raped." Using pseudonyms to protect their
privacy, "Amy" and "Vicky" are two young women-photographed as
children-whose images and vidoes have become some of the most commonly
circulated sets of pornographic materials.8  Abused by her uncle at a young
4. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120
Stat. 587, 623 ("The advent of the Internet has greatly increased the ease of transporting,
distributing, receiving, and advertising child pornography in interstate commerce .... The advent
of inexpensive computer equipment with the capacity to store large numbers of digital images of
child pomography has greatly increased the ease of possessing child pornography. Taken
together, these technological advances have had the unfortunate result of greatly increasing the
interstate market in child pomography."); see also MONIQUE MATTEi FERRARO & EOGHAN
CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW
AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (2005) (describing the technologically savvy subculture of child
pornography aficionados who congregate on the Internet to view, collect, and trade images
anonymously online); TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 3, at 91.
5. As announced by Congress and echoed by the Supreme Court: "'Child pornography and
child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a
nationwide scale."' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.I (1982) (quoting S. REP. NO.
95-438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42); see also YAMAN AKDENIZ,
INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 2-3 (2008) ("The global, decentralized and
borderless nature of the Internet creates a potentially infinite and unbreakable communications
complex which cannot be readily bounded by one national government or even several or many
acting in concert.").
6. See Bryan McKenzie, Reality ofSexual Abuse Seems So Surreal, THE DAILY PROGRESS,
Jan. 8, 2011 (clarifying that child pornography is a "recording of abuse and frequently torture
inflicted upon children").
7. Susan Donaldson James, 'Misty Series' Haunts Girl Long After Rape, ABC NEWS (Feb.
8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/internet-porn-misty-series-traumatizes-child-victim-
pedophiles/story?id=9773590 (quoting Amy's attorney, James R. Marsh) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Most child pornography victims were not "abducted into sexual slavery," but
were more likely seduced by someone that they knew. See KENNETH V. LANNING, THE NAT'L
CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATING CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION 25 (3d ed. 1992).
8. Amy and Vicky are the only identified victims who have filed claims for restitution
against the possessors of their images. See John Schwartz, Pornography, and an Issue of
Restitution at a Price Set by the Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A19. Attorney James R.
Marsh represents Amy and has submitted hundreds of copies of Amy's filings to state's
attorneys' offices across the country. Id; see also Christian Nolan, Paying Dearly for Child Porn
Possession, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE, Mar. 2, 2009, at 3 (announcing that although Amy was one of
twenty-four victims identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC) on an individual's hard drive, she was the only one to come forward and claim
restitution). Vicky has also sought restitution in over eighty federal cases. Clair Johnson,
Fighting Back: Child Porn Victim Seeks Restitution After Years of Exploitation, Shame, BILLINGS
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age, Amy became the 9principal in a collection of photographs and videos
called the Misty series. Described by the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children as an array of "crime scene photos," the materials
document her "perform[ing] a series of extremely graphic acts, including oral
copulation, anal penetration, and masturbation, with an adult man.',t
Similarly, Vicky's biological father videotaped and photographed his own
sexual abuse of her, as well as abuse by other adults, including some "scripted
sexual related scenarios."
As their images spread, victims like Amy and Vicky wrestle with feelings of
helplessness stemming from the perpetual exposure of their images and the
constant anxiety that someone will recognize them.' 2 They also battle feelings
of responsibility at the thought of their abuse inspiring a viewer to similarly
GAZETTE, May 27, 2010, at 10A. While conducting evidence reviews submitted by law
enforcement, NCMEC has encountered over 35,750 images associated with the video series
featuring Amy and found images associated with that series 8860 times in 2009 alone. See Brief
of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on Issues of Restitution for Victims of
Child Pornography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 at 5, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781
(E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-cr-61) [hereinafter Brief of the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children]. Comparably, images of Vicky have been identified in over 8000 cases.
Johnson, supra note 8, at 10A.
9. James, supra note 7; see also Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that the series has been actively collected and exchanged
since 1998). "A series is a collection of images and/or video files taken over a period of time and
typically containing both apparent child pornography as well as non-pomographic images of a
child or children." Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, supra note 8,
at 5. Collectors of child pornography find a series to be more desirable than individual images
because the completed set "adds value to the collection . . . [and] there is also potential for
increasing the capacity to create sexual arousal." TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 3, at 161.
10. Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, supra note 8, at 6.
I1. United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Aumais, No. 08-CR-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 13, 2010) ("[The circulation] causes Amy to believe that strangers are viewing her at this
most vulnerable and degrading time in her life and that, given this permanent record, the
humiliation and degradation will continue forever as others view her images."); see also
Document: Victim Impact Statement of Girl in Misty Series, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 25,
2009, http://hamptonroads.com/2009/10/document-victim-impact-statement-girl-misty-series
[hereinafter Amy's Victim-Impact Statement] ("I want it all erased. I want it all stopped. But I am
powerless to stop it just like I was powerless to stop my [abuser] . . . . It's like my life is on hold
for [the day someone sees those awful pictures of me] and I am frozen in time waiting."). A
victim-impact statement is "[a] statement read into the record during sentencing to inform the
judge or jury of the financial, physical, and psychological impact of the crime on the victim and
the victim's family." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1703 (9th ed. 2009). Victims have the option
of submitting a victim-impact statement to be used in proceedings against newly apprehended
possessors. See OFFICE OF VICTIM ASSISTANCE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY VICTIM ASSISTANCE (CPVA): A REFERENCE FOR VICTIMS AND
PARENTS/GUARDIANS OF VICTIMS, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim
_assistance/brochures-handouts/cpva.
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abuse a child for economic profit.13 In her victim-impact statement, Amy
recognized that she is "exploited and used every day and every night
somewhere in the world by someone," which makes her feel like she is "being
,,14abused over and over and over again. Vicky, too, explained that "[b]ecause
the most intimate parts of [her] are being viewed by thousands of strangers and
traded around, [she] feel[s5 out of control . . . like [she is] being raped by each
and every one of them." While coping with these pains, victims sustain
medical and psychological expenses and develop financial problems resulting
from their inability to maintain regular employment or meet the demands of a
school schedule.' 6
Seeking recompense for these harms, Amy and Vicky have turned to
Internet downloaders-the consumers of their images-for restitution. They
have filed suit under § 2259 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which
mandates the payment of restitution to sexually exploited children.' 8 However,
before restitution can be awarded, courts must ascertain a finding of proximate
causation between victims' injuries and defendants' possession of their
images.19
13. Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, supra note 8, at 8; see
also S. REP. No. 95-438, at 7 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 44 (recognizing the
"vast potential [for] profits in child pornography" and surveying the pricing for some produced
materials).
14. Amy's Victim-Impact Statement, supra note 12. Amy warned that she had difficulty
explaining "what it feels like to know that at any moment, anywhere, someone is looking at
pictures of [her] as a little girl being abused by [her] uncle and is getting some sick enjoyment
from it." Id. Amy's statement accurately recognizes that most child pornography is used for the
"sexual arousal and gratification of pedophiles." See LANNING, supra note 7, at 28.
15. United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24,
2009) (emphasis added); see also Johnson, supra note 8 (quoting Vicky's attorney, Carol
Hepburn, who proclaimed that child pornography is a "'horrendous violation of privacy' because
viewing these images is 'just like looking in the window when the abuse was happening"').
16. PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 151 (2d ed.
2010). As a consequence of abuse, Amy suffered many psychological problems that caused her
to fail classes and have difficulty keeping a job. Amy's Victim-Impact Statement, supra note 12.
17. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at A19; see also infra Part I.C.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006).
19. Proximate cause is defined as "[a] cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an
act or omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be
imposed on the actor, [or a] cause that directly produces an event and without which the event
would not have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009). It has also
classically been described as "an unfortunate term [that] is merely the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct." Id.
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264
(5th ed. 1984)). However, various federal circuit courts have disagreed as to whether § 2259
contains a "proximate cause" requirement. See infra note 78 (surveying the
statutory-interpretation arguments that circuits have made).
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Although the application of § 2259 to other crimes of sexual exploitation
may be straightforward, the recent trend of applying § 2259 to the possession20
of child pornography is novel21 and has generated much controversy and
ambiguity.22 Often not the original abusers, producers, or distributors of the
pornography, Internet downloaders may nonetheless qualify as possessors of
the materials. 23 However, an end-user might argue that the concrete cause of a
20. In the virtual context, possession is a recent concept. Cf FERRARO & CASEY, supra
note 4, at 246. In essence, "[p]ossession is accomplished both by virtue of the individual viewing
the image and therefore 'possessing' it and by 'downloading' it onto the hard drive of the
computer. An affirmative action on the part of the viewer to 'save' the image is not necessary to
establish possession." Id. Although recently developed, "[t]he vast majority of child
pornography prosecutions today involve images contained on computer hard drives, computer
disks, and related media." Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 624.
21. See United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(acknowledging that the application of § 2259 to Internet child pornography cases is "relatively
new" and has not been addressed directly by many appellate courts); United States v. Granato,
No. 2:08-cr-00198-RCJ-GWF, slip op. at 9 (D. Nev. Aug. 28, 2009) (resolving the "novel legal
issue" by allowing the parties to stipulate the restitution amount).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794 (D.N.D. 2010) ("In
production cases there is rarely a question of causation whereas in possession cases the
boundaries of proximate cause become far more murky."); see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at
A19 (discussing opposing views on recent child exploitation cases). One law professor called the
first decision granting restitution "highly questionable" because it "'stretche[d] personal
accountability to the breaking point."' See id (quoting Jonathan Turley, Court Orders Former
Pfizer Executive to Pay $200,00 to Woman Photographed as a Child While Being Sexually
Abused, JONATHAN TURLEY (Feb. 24, 2009), http://jonathanturley.org/2009/02/24/court-orders-
former-viagra-executive-to-pay-200000-to-womanphotographed-as-a-child-while-being-sexually-
abused). An expert in sex crimes agreed with this criticism, stating that the harm caused by
possession is less direct than that caused by the the abuse and that "'there is such a thing as going
too far."' Id
23. One scholar has compared the different levels of participation in child pornography to a
"chain of liability." AKDENIZ, supra note 5, at 12. The creators of the images are at the top of
the chain, followed by the distributors who circulate the images for either commercial or
noncommercial purposes. Id Possessors are at the bottom of the chain because they only
download and view the images. Id The crime of possession may also be broken down into an
"offending typology," which distinguishes varying patterns of Internet behavior. See RICHARD
WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, OFFICE OF CMTY ORIENTED POLICING SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET, 15-17 (2006). For example, "browsers"
come across images of child pornography by chance but "knowingly" save the images, which
decreases the possibility of detection. Id at 15. "Trawlers," on the other hand, seek the images
through active searches and may engage in networking activities. Id Additionally, typologies
also differentiate between nonsecure and secure collectors. Id. at 15-16. Nonsecure collectors
"do not employ security strategies," whereas secure collectors are "members of a close
newsgroup or other secret pedophile ring." Id. at 16. Secure collectors "engage in high levels of
networking and employ sophisticated security measures to protect their activities from detection."
Id Regardless of how they obtain the materials, the most significant aspect of this conduct is that
individuals collect the images. That is, they do not "merely view [the] pornography: [t]hey save
it. It comes to represent their most cherished sexual fantasies." See LANNING, supra note 7, at
23.
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victim's suffering is at the hands of the original abuser rather than at the click
of their mouse, for they did not commit the actual abuse.24
Courts grapple with the issue of whether to award restitution in cases where
the proximate causation between an Internet downloader's possession and the
victim's injuries may not be apparent.25 Some courts deny restitution,
concluding that the victim's harm derived from a general distress about the
widespread circulation of his or her images, which could not have been caused
by an individual defendant's possession.26 By contrast, other courts award
restitution, concluding that the victim's harm is proximately caused by the
27defendant's consumption due to his substantial participation in the market.
As a result, courts across the country are splintered-some have awarded
28millions, while others do not grant an award at all. Thus, the jurisdiction in
which the victim files suit considerably influences the victim's fate. 2 9 This
current state of the law presents an alarming need for uniformity and fairness
on behalf of both the victim and the defendant.
This Comment proposes that proximate causation does exist between one
defendant's possession and the victim's injuries, but that the award of
restitution should reflect only the harm caused by that defendant's personal
offense. Part I introduces the historical, theoretical, and statutory development
of restitution and explores the dichotomous decisions in which courts have
attempted to interpret and apply § 2259 in cases involving the possession of
child pornography. Part II then analyzes the differing perspectives that courts
have employed to ascertain the individual possessor's role in causing the
victim's harm. Part III compares the methods of calculating restitution
employed by awarding courts. Finally, in Part IV, this Comment concludes
that the defendant's act of possession proximately causes the victim's harm.
However, to calculate a fair award of restitution for both parties, this Comment
suggests that courts should engage in a fact-based inquiry focusing on
24. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 24, 2009). The defendant in Hicks argued that the direct cause of the victim's losses was the
abuse by the victim's father, not the defendant's possession. Id. However, according to one
study, "[i]t appears that these offenders are far from being innocent, sexually 'curious' men who,
through naivete or dumb luck, became entangled in the World Wide Web." Michael L. Bourke &
Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child
Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 188 (2009). Indeed,
this study revealed that many of the defendants in possession cases later disclosed that they had
committed hands-on offenses as well. Id. at 189.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra Part I.C.I.
27. See infra Part I.C.2.
28. Compare United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (awarding a restitution award of $3,680,153), with United States v. Covert,
Crim. No. 09-332, 2011 WL 134060, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Jan 14, 2011) (declining to award
restitution).
29. See infra Parts I.C.1-2.
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specified aggravating factors, and also proposes that Congress enact legislation
setting monetary boundaries to help curb judicial discretion in applying the
statutory mandate.
I. THE HISTORICAL, STATUTORY, AND JUDICIAL GROUNDWORK
As advocated by the crime victims' rights movement, the most significant
purposes of restitution are retribution and rehabilitation.30 With these
objectives in mind, Congress enacted the mandatory restitution provision of
Title 18, which establishes the right to restitution for victims of child
exploitation. 31 When applying this provision to case involving possession of
child pornography, federal courts strive to reconcile the competing concerns of
compensating the victim and implementing a mandate limited by the
requirement of proximate causation. 32  The following sections explore the
development of restitution, the theoretical foundation of the governing statute,
and the ensuing judicial responses.
A. The Rise of Victims' Rights and the Promotion ofRestitution
During the 1960s and 1970s, progressive activism dominated American
social and political arenas and incited the civil rights, women's rights, and
anti-war movements. This dynamic, sociopolitical environment set the stage
for the emergence of the crime victims' rights movement in the late 1970s.34
At this time, Americans became increasingly conscious of rising crimes rates. 35
Additionally, society began to recognize that its disinterested legal system
lacked the protections necessary to aid victims in their response to and
30. See infra text accompanying note 41.
31. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part I.C.
33. See VALIANT R.W. POLINY, A PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGING VICTIMS'
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 9-10 (1994) (outlining some of the social and political developments of the
1960s and 1970s). The development of "victimology," a new theoretical approach to criminal
justice, also influenced victims' rights. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 16, at 6. Victimology
urges the penal system to focus more on the crime victim. Id. at 6-7. As crime increased during
the 1960s, this theory gained momentum, sparking a corresponding increase in public awareness
and interest in victimization. Id at 7.
34. POLINY, supra note 33, at 9-10 (explaining that "it was the merger of identities implicit
in women denied political empowerment and women as crime victims" that fueled the victims'
rights movement (citations omitted)); TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 16, at 8.
35. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT vi (1982)
("The specter of violent crime and the knowledge that, without warning, any person can be
attacked or crippled, robbed, or killed, lurks at the fringes of consciousness. Every citizen of this
country is more impoverished, less free, more fearful, and less safe, because of the ever-present
threat of the criminal . . . . Every 23 minutes, someone is murdered. Every six minutes a woman is
raped.").
Ill15
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recovery from crime.36  Seeking to address these inefficiencies, the crime
victims' rights movement focused on the establishment and recognition of
rights and remedies for crime victims.37  One of the movement's remedial
objectives included restoration of the "restitutive concepts" rooted in both
ancient and premodern criminal prosecutions. Advocates for crime victims
consider restitution necessary to offset the costs incurred by both the victim
and society. 3 9
As a consequence of its dual role in both civil and criminal legal systems,
restitution has evolved to serve several different purposes. 40 Generally, civil
restitution serves as a means of compensation for the aggrieved party, whereas
criminal restitution serves as a means of "rehabilitation, deterrence, and
retribution." 41  However, as the victims' rights movement advanced, "[a]
restitutive theory of criminal justice . . . developed to justify redress to victims
from a philosophical and ethical perspective. Under this theory, a crime is
viewed as a violation of the 'rights' of the victim by the offender which creates
,,42
an imbalance between them .... By "emphasiz[ing] the wrongfulness of
36. See id. (noting how the criminal justice system treats victims who are brave enough to
come forward as mere "appendages" and offers them little protection in exchange for their vital
cooperation).
37. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 16, at I1-13.
38. Id at 4-5, 153. The concept of an offender's repayment to his or her victim is rooted in
the Code of Hammurabi and the Torah, which proclaim "life for life, eye for eye, . . . wound for
wound, stripe for stripe." Id at 4 (quoting Exodus 21:23-25). As society evolved and
governmental and religious authorities developed, the focus shifted from criminal repercussions
to private and civil wrongs, reserving criminal penalties for only extreme offenses. Id. at 5. As a
result, criminal-legal proceedings focused less on the victim's rehabilitation and more on the
government's prosecution of the offender. Id
39. Id at 151-54. After suffering a crime, victims must confront medical and psychiatric
expenses, uncompensated leave from employment, victim services, and the "[i]ntangible
costs . . . [of] victim fear, pain, suffering, and lost quality of life." Id at 151. Society must
shoulder the burden of "investigating, prosecuting, and punishing an offender," as well as suffer
the loss of the "victims' productivity as a result of their victimization." Id
40. See POLINY, supra note 33, at 236-38, 237 n.158 (citing Josephine Gittler, Expanding
the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, II PEPP. L.
REV. 117, 136-39 (1984)); see also Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the
Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2717-19 (2005)
(discussing the bifurcated history of restitution in both criminal and civil approaches).
"Restitution has been described as ... a 'rehabilitative tool,' a 'punitive measure' and an 'equity
tool."' Id at 2711 (quoting BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF
CoURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A STUDY OF THE ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION VICTIM WITNESS PROJECT 1 (1989)).
41. Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 931, 937 (1984) (citation omitted).
42. POLINY, supra note 33, at 237. Echoing this argument, the Aristotelian theory of
corrective justice provides that "[d]oing injustice and suffering injustice forges a link-a
synallagma-between the parties and nobody else." FRANCESCO GIGLIO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS 150-51 (2007). Because the wrongdoer achieves a gain while the
1116 [Vol. 60:1
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the offense and the defendant's moral responsibility," the retributive aspect of
restitution strives to rectify this imbalance by requirin an offender to
compensate the victim in an amount tailored to fit the crime.
B. Statutory Underpinnings: The Development of Mandatory Restitution for
Crimes of Child Sexual Exploitation
In response to developing concerns about victims' rights, President Ronald
Reagan established the Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982.44 This task
force recommended that Congress "require restitution in all cases, unless the
court provides specific reasons for failing to require it." 45  Heeding this
guidance, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA),
which permits restitution in criminal sentencing.46 Reporting on the VWPA,
the Senate emphasized its view on the purpose of restitution, stating "whatever
else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should
also insure that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the
victim to his or her prior state of well-being." 47 Over the following decade,
48judges used their discretion to order restitution when they found it necessary.
In 1994, Congress converted restitution from a discretionary award into a
mandatory reqI uirement for victims of sex crimes, child exploitation, and
related crimes. 9 Enacted as a component of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994,50 § 2259 mandates that "the court shall order restitution for any
offense under [Chapter 110],",51 which criminalizes the sexual exploitation and
other abuses of children. 52  Some of the acts criminalized in Chapter 110
include the engagement of sexual conduct, 53 the sex trafficking of children,54
victim suffers an "excess of pain," the "just is a mean between loss and gain." Id. Although
some losses cannot be calculated in economic terms, money may nonetheless be used to equalize
the gain and loss "as far as possible." Id. at 151.
43. Note, supra note 41, at 939.
44. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 35, at ii.
45. Id. at 18.
46. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248,
1253-55 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006)); see also TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra
note 16, at 153 (noting that the VWPA included restitution as an independent sanction).
47. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536.
48. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 205, 110 Stat.
1227, 1229-30 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(1) (2006)) (providing courts the
discretion to order restitution); Matthew Dickman, Comment, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical
Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1687, 1688
(2009) (tracing the history ofjudges' roles in ordering restitution for crime victims).
49. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40113(a)(1)(b)(1),
108 Stat. 1902, 1904-10 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2259 (2006)).
50. Id. § 40113(b)(1), 108 Stat. at 1907-10 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2259).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2259; United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(identifying § 2259 as the first federal statute to require restitution in criminal sentencing).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260.
53. Id. § 2251.
1117
Catholic University Law Review
the creation of sexually explicit images,55 and the reception and possession of
child pornography. 56
Section 2259 instructs that the defendant shall "pay the victim . . . the full
amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court."57 These losses may
include expenses sustained from "medical services relating to physical,
psychiatric, or psychological care,"58 and "anz other losses suffered by the
victim as a proximate result of the offense." 9 The government bears the
burden of establishing the victim's losses by a preponderance of the
evidence. 60
Congress further broadened the scope of mandatory restitution by enacting
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). 61 The MVRA
requires restitution for certain crimes that cause a victim bodily injury or
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id § 2252A(a). The landmark Supreme Court case regarding child pornography, New
York v. Ferber, upheld a New York statute that controlled the circulation of child pornography.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1982). In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment does not protect child pornography and, with regard to possession,
recognized the inherent link between the circulation of child pornography and the victim's harm.
Id. at 758-59, 764. In 1990, the Supreme Court also held that a state may constitutionally
proscribe the possession of child pornography. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
Various pieces of legislation identify the harms caused by the possession of child pornography.
For example, in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Congress concluded
that:
A substantial interstate market in child pornography exists, including not only a
multimillion dollar industry, but also a nationwide network of individuals openly
advertising their desire to exploit children and to traffic in child pornography. Many of
these individuals distribute child pornography with the expectation of receiving other
child pornography in return.
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(l)(B), 120 Stat. 587, 623. Congress further emphasized that "[e]very
instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the privacy of
the victims and a repetition of their abuse." Id § 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. at 624.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1).
58. Id. § 2259(b)(3)(A).
59. Id § 2259(b)(3)(F). Section 2259(b)(2) instructs the court to look to § 3664 for
procedural requirements for imposing and enforcing restitution. Id. §§ 2259(b)(2), 3364. Victims
may submit an affidavit representing their amount of losses subject to restitution. Id §
3664(d)(2)(A)(vi). After the court determines the amount of the restitution to be awarded, both
parties and the victim have the opportunity to object. See id § 3664(e). Section 3664 also states
that "[i]f the court finds that more than (one] defendant has contributed to the loss ... the court
may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion
liability among the defendants to reflect the[ir] level of contribution." Id. § 3664(h).
60. Id. § 3664(e). In evaluating whether to order restitution, a court may not consider the
defendant's economic circumstances or the victim's receipt of compensation from another source.
Id. § 2259(b)(4)(B).
61. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
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monetary loss.62 Congress intended for the legislation to secure payment of
restitution and to ensure that the offender "pays the debt owed to the victim as
well as to society."63 Most recently, Congress enacted the Crime Victims'
Rights Act (CVRA) 64 in 2004 to further "reiterat[e] the right to restitution
created by the MVRA."65
C. The Judicial Arena: Conflicting District Court Decisions
Federal district courts across the country are engaged in a good-faith
endeavor to apply § 2259 to the crime of possession of child pornography,66
67but have applied different rationales, resulting in conflicting holdings.
Despite generating divergent outcomes, these cases generally share the same
factual circumstances and typically involve the discovery of images or videos
of child pornography on a defendant's hard drive. After the defendant pleads
guilty, the court considers any restitution claims,69 employing a two-pronged
-70analysis.
62. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1), (c)(1); Dickman, supra note 48, at 1688.
63. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925.
64. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims' Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)).
65. United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
66. See Courts Weigh Criminal Restitution for Victims in Child Porn Cases, FoXNEWS.COM
(Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/02/08/courts-weigh-criminal-restitution-
victims-child-porn-cases/ (quoting Amy's attorney, James Marsh, who stated that courts are
"really grappling with this in good faith"); see also United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344,
1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (recognizing that the application of the mandatory restitution provision of
§ 2259, as applied to possession of child pornography from the Internet, is a relatively new area).
67. See infra Part I.C. 1-2.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 13, 2010) (explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing child
pornography and one count of transportation in foreign commerce after being apprehended by
border patrol officials with DVDs, laptops, a video recorder, and a camera that contained over
two thousand images and over one hundred videos of child pornography); United States v.
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that the defendant pleaded guilty to
one count of possessing child pornography after admitting he knowingly possessed between one
hundred fifty to three hundred images of sexually exploited minors on his computer), mandamus
denied sub nom., In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd on reh'g sub nom., In re Amy
Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011).
69. Cf United States v. Buchanan, No. 09-cr-0095, at I (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2010) (order for
government to file memorandum) (discussing § 2259's mandatory restitution provisions upon a
defendant's conviction). The government typically requests restitution for the victim after the
defendant has been convicted. See, e.g., id. at 2 (noting that the court had handled several other
cases where victims sought restitution). However, in United States v. Buchanan, when both the
prosecutor and defense attorneys stipulated that there would not be a request for restitution, the
judge ordered the government to explain why the victim was not entitled to restitution. Id at 2-3.
The court emphasized that the defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography, which is
an offense included in Chapter 110. Id. at 1. The judge stated:
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First, the court must determine whether the claimant qualifies as a victim
within the meaning of § 2259.n A "victim" is defined as an "individual
harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under [Chapter 110 of Title
18]."7 The Supreme Court has established that the circulation of child
pornography is "intrinsically related to [a child's] sexual abuse."73 As a result,
each time someone views a photograph or a video depicting the victim's sexual
abuse, the claimant's original abuse is perpetuated and the harm is
intensified.74  Circuit courts have further indicated that consumers who
"merely' or 'passively' receive[] or possess[] child pornography [still] directly
contribute to th[e] continuing victimization."75  Consumers perpetuate the
abuse, invade the victim's privacy, and give original abusers an incentive to
document their conduct and digitally distribute it for financial gain.
Therefore, courts have unequivocally answered this first inquiry in the
affirmative. 77
Section 2259 quite explicitly provides that an order of restitution is mandatory for such
offenses . . . [and g]iven the clear Congressional mandate that those convicted of child-
pornography offenses pay restitution to their victims, the Court will no longer accept
silence from the government when an identified victim of a
child-pornography offense seeks restitution.
Id at 1-2. The court thereafter ordered Buchanan to pay $1000 to Amy. See James Walsh,
Possessor of Child Porn to Pay $1,000 in Restitution, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 5, 2010, at B I.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-cr-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *1-3
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (2006)) (clarifying that courts must first
determine whether the depicted child qualifies as a "victim" of the defendant's possession within
§ 2259 and, secondly, whether proximate causation is required), af'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir.
2010).
71. Id. at *1.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c). This definition is broad compared to other provisions, including
the VWPA and the MVRA, which define a "victim" as a "person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered." 18
U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2) (2006).
73. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
74. Id. (stating that "the harm to the child is exacerbated by the[] circulation [of the
pornography]"); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, Ill (1990) ("The pornography's
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to
come.").
75. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that "[t]here is nothing 'casual'
or theoretical about the scars [the victims] will bear from being abused for [a consumer's]
advantage").
76. Osborne, 495 U.S. at I10-11; Goff 501 F.3d at 260; Norris, 159 F.3d at 930; see also
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759-60 (arguing that to curtail the child pornography market effectively,
enforcement should target the consumers of these markets)..
77. See, e.g., Norris, 159 F.3d at 930 (stating that the "effects stemming directly from a
consumer's receipt of child pornography amply justify" that the child depicted in the pornography
is a victim); United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-cr-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C.) ("[B]y
both legislative intent and judicial construction, the law is clear that the children depicted in child
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Second, the court must determine whether the defendant's conduct satisfies
§ 2259's proximate cause requirement. 7 District courts diverge on this point
of the analysis.79 The following two subsections explore these conflicting
decisions, which highlight the necessity for national uniformity and fairness.
1. The Declining Courts: A Victim's Generalized Harm Is Not Proximately
Caused by an Offender's Individual Possession
Some district courts have concluded that a defendant's individual act of
possession does not proximately cause a victim's harm and, therefore, have
refused to award restitution (these courts are hereinafter referred to as
"declining courts").80 Although no court disputes that the conglomeration of
creators, possessors, and distributors of child pornography all contribute to a
victim's continued suffering,81 declining courts struggle with the notion of
individualized responsibility for generalized harm.82
Recognizing that an inconceivable number of possessors contribute to a
victim's suffering, declining courts conclude that proximate cause can only be
pornography are victims not only of the makers of the pornography but also of its possessors."),
aff'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010).
78. See Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *2. The threshold question is whether the statute
contains a proximate cause requirement at all. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr- 150,
2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009). In answering this initial inquiry, circuits are
split. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing the circuit split
about whether the proximate cause requirement in the catch-all category applies to all of the
categories listed in the statute). The Fifth Circuit stands alone in its conclusion that § 2259 does
not contain the element of proximate causation. See In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190,
198-201 (5th Cir. 2011) (indentifying the weaknesses in the district court's usage of
statutory-interpretation cases and concluding that the proximate cause language is limited to
§ 2259(b)(1)(F), as opposed to all of the categories listed in §§ 2259(b)(1)(A)-(E), based on the
differentiation between varying statutory definitions of "victim"). Most circuits, however,
conclude that § 2259 does contain a proximate cause requirement. See, e.g., Monzel, 641 F.3d at
535 (concluding that § 2259 contains a proximate cause requisite based on "the traditional
principles of tort and criminal law and § 2259(c)'s definition of 'victim' as an individual harmed
'as a result' of the defendant's offense"); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.2d 1204, 1208-09
(11th Cir. 2011) (finding the language of § 2259 to be "plain" and that because of the language of
the statute, proximate cause must be established). The statutory interpretation and other relevant
arguments for this threshold inquiry are beyond the scope of this Comment, and this Comment is
based upon the conclusion that § 2259 includes a proximate cause requirement.
79. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050,
at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (D.N.D. Aug. 4, 2010)
(declaring that "[t]here is no question that everyone associated with the evils of child
pornography .. . contribute[s] to the victim's never-ending harm"); United States v. Paroline, 672
F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (commenting that "no doubt" exists that everyone
involved with child pornography contributes to the ongoing harm), mandamus denied sub nom.,
In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'don reh'g sub nom., In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d
190 (5th Cir. 2011).
82. See, e.g., Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *4-5.
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established if the court is able to identify the harm caused by the particular
defendant on trial. For instance, in United States v. Van Brackle, the court
emphasized that it must be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty "what
proportion of the total harm was proximately caused by this defendant and this
offense." 84  To make this determination, a court must make the distinction
between the harm resulting from the defendant's conduct and the harm
resultin from both the original abuse and the widespread circulation of the
images. Without this differentiation, an award of restitution would hold the
defendant liable for "all losses resulting from all acts by all abusers." 86 In Van
Brackle, the government was unable to separate the different harms, so the
court concluded that § 2259's proximate cause requirement was not satisfied.
Similarly, in United States v. Covert, the court probed the facts in an effort to
determine the specific amount of losses caused by the defendant's possession.
Though recognizing the difficulty in establishing proximate cause in these
cases, the court concluded that the government simply did not put forth enough
evidence to demonstrate that the defendant caused a "specific loss" to the
*89victim.
83. See, e.g., id. at *5.
84. Id at *4. Van Brackle pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in
violation of § 2252(a)(2)(A). Id. at *1. Vicky and Amy sought restitution in this case because
their images were found in his collection. Id
85. Id at *4; see also United States v. Rowe, No. 1:09-cr-80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *5
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2010). The court in United States v. Rowe expressed that it could not "ignore
the fact that a significant portion of the psychological harm . . . was inflicted by [Vicky's] father,"
which "is distinct from the psychological harm inflicted by the untold numbers of individuals
(including the Defendant) who subsequently received and possessed images of [the] abuse." Id.
at *4. In presenting Vicky's total losses, the court concluded that the government failed to make
this distinction. Id at *5. Thus, the court was unable to "estimate the amount of Vicky's losses
that can be attributed to the Defendant with any 'reasonable certainty."' Id (quoting United
States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007)).
86. Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Covert, Crim. No. 09-332, 2011 WL 134060, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14
2011) ("[The court] must examine the evidence to determine if this Defendant's conduct in this
case was a substantial factor in Amy's damages."); see also United States v. Solsbury, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 795 (D.N.D. 2010) (noting that the government did not make an effort to "show the
portion of [the] losses specifically caused by [the defendant's] possession of five pornographic
videos"). In reviewing the decision in United States v. Aumais, the court was unable to determine
how the Aumais court's analysis differentiated from the finding that Amy was a victim under the
statute. Covert, 2011 WL 134060, at *8.
89. Id. at *9; see also United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 832 (W.D. Va. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1135 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the court
must find "'explicit findings of fact' supporting its calculation" for it to be upheld on review, and
the evidence introduced in this case does not allow the court to "reasonably calculate the measure
of harm done to the victim proximately caused by the Defendant's conduct" (quoting United
States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 505 (4th Cir. 1996))); United States v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907,
2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (explaining that there must be an
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Declining courts refuse to conclude that defendants, as individuals, cause the
victims' specified harm beyond their pre-existing suffering.90 For example, the
court in United States v. Berk focused on this premise and concluded that Amy
and Vicky sustained their injuries before the defendant even possessed their
images.91 Examining the evidence, the court expressly noted that upon
learning of the defendant's possession, neither victim pursued counseling nor
did they experience a decline in their attendence at work.92 In light of these
facts, the court believed that "[t]heir 'prior state of well-being' had already
been inalterably damaged both by the initial abuse and by the idea that other
individuals were viewing their images on a continuing basis." 93  Thus, the
general idea of circulation, rather than Berk's individual possession, caused the
victims' harm.94
In United States v. Faxon, the court could not find how the defendant's
personal possession caused any of the victims' alleged harm.95  The court
emphasized that the victims were unaware of the defendant's identity, his
criminal acts, the facts of the case, and even the occurrence of related hearings
on the matter.96  The court believed that this lack of knowledge about the
particular defendant indicated that the victims' suffering would have existed
regardless of the defendant's individual possession.97
"identification of a specific injury to the victim that was caused by the specific conduct of the
defendant").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192-93 (D. Me. 2009) (indicating
that the victim had already suffered the losses shown at the trial before the defendant viewed the
images).
91. Id. at 192. Berk pleaded guilty to the possession of fifty thousand still images and fifty
videos of child pornography in violation of § 2252A(5)(B). Id. at 185. Of these materials, six
thousand images and ten videos belong to one hundred four identified series. Id. Because images
of Amy and Vicky were found in Berk's collection, they were victims in this case. Id. at 185-86.
92. Id at 191-92.
93. Id at 192 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-179, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
924, 926; see also United States v. Patton, No. 09-43, 2010 WL 1006521, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar.
16, 2010) ("[A]lthough [the victim's] harm may be in part a result of [the defendant's] crime, it is
also a result of crimes that occurred long before [the defendant's] possession of the images.").
94. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
95. United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Pursuant to a
search warrant, a forensic analysis of the defendant's computer revealed downloaded images and
videos of child pornography from peer-to-peer file sharing software. Id at 1348-49. The images
include those from the Vicky series and the Misty series. Id. at 1349. The defendant pleaded
guilty to the transportation of sexually exploitive materials of children on the Internet in violation
of § 2252(a)(1), and possession of child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(4)(B). Id at 1347.
The court stated that the evidence "clearly indicates that [the victim's] continued psychological
trauma would occur regardless of whether or not this Defendant committed the criminal acts in
this case." Id. at 1358; see also United States v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (noting that the evidence exhibited harm caused by the conduct of
others, but not by the defendant).
96. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
97. Id. at 1358.
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Even if causation could be established, declining courts stress the
impossibility of calculating an award of restitution." One court argued that
quantifying the victim's losses would be an "evidentiary nightmare." 99  To
these courts, the countless numbers of possessors make it impossible to discern
with reasonable certainty the losses caused by a particular defendant convicted
of possession.100 This lack of specific evidence would cause an "award of
restitution [to] be an arbitary calcuation based on speculation and guess work,
at best."10'
2. The Awarding Courts: Individual Possession Proximately Causes the
Victim's Harm
Some courts conclude that the defendant's individual act of possession
proximately causes the victim's harm1 02 and, therefore, award restitution to the
victims (these courts are hereinafter referred to as "awarding courts"). 0 3
a. The Finding ofProximate Causation
Awarding courts ground their analysis of proximate causation in their
recognition of § 2259's mandatory restitution requirement.104 One court
described the provision as "explicit and unwaivable."l 05  However, each
awarding court has also acknowledged that the statutory language suggesting a
causal requirement limits the provision.106 In United States v. Aumais, the
court proclaimed that "circumscribed only by the limits of causation, Congress
intended in § 2259 to mandate full compensation to victims from defendants
98. See, e.g., United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-96 (D.N.D. 2010).
99. Id. at 795.
100. See, e.g., id. ("There are hundreds of thousands of individuals who have contributed in
some way to the victim's losses by viewing these disturbing images over the past
decade. . . . There is nothing in [the] evidence before the court, which permits it to be able to
discern, with any reasonable certainty, [the] losses . . . caused by [the defendant]."); Faxon, 689
F. Supp. 2d at 1360-61.
101. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 796 (commenting that there must be "some semblance of
reason, common sense, and fairness rather than speculation"); see also United States v. Rowe,
No. 1:09-cr-80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2010) (indicating that the court
could attempt to quantify the harm caused by the original abuse and the harm caused by the
defendant's conduct, but "the result would simply be an arbitrary and speculative figure").
102. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
103. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-cr-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 12, 2010), affd393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010).
105. Id.; see also United States v. Buchanan,, No. 09-05-0095, at 2 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2010)
(order for government to file memorandum) (demanding that the government explain why no
restitution was requested in light of the "clear Congressional mandate").
106. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Brunner,
2010 WL 148433, at *2.
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for all harm caused by a defendant's criminal conduct." 07 The Ninth Circuit
sustained this statutory interpretation by requiring the district court to order
restitution whenever it convicts a defendant of a Chapter 110 crime. 08
Some awarding courts analyze the proximate causation issue by determining
whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
victim's harm.109 In United States v. Aumais, the court indicated that to be
considered substantial, the defendant's conduct must be "important or
significant"; however, this determination can be complicated because of the
incalculable number of possessors.110  Despite this complexity, the court
explained that substantiality "concerns the extent of that harm and not the
comparative responsibility." t1  The harm caused by a defendant's possession
"is not obviated or diminished by the fact that others also possessed the
images."ll2 Rather, the court concluded that the harm caused by one
defendant's possession exists regardless of whether others also possess the
material and whether the victim had actual knowledge of the defendant's
-113possession.
Instead of employing a test, some awarding courts infer proximate causation
from the defendant's participation in the market.114 In United States v.
Brunner, the court found that the defendant "participated in an ongoing cycle
of abuse and thereby contributed to the victims' mental and emotional
107. United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2010).
108. United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App'x 377, 378 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit also
proposes that § 2259 is "phrased in generous terms" to allow for an appropriate recompense in
light of the enduring nature of the victim's harm. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th
Cir. 1999).
109. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613-14 ("[T]he real issue is not whether Defendant has
caused Amy harm ... but whether his doing so is a substantial factor in her overall harm."). In
contrast to cases that solely involve possession of child pornography, Hardy involved the receipt,
possession, and circulation of such images. Id. at 599; see also United States v. Crandon, 173
F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the
defendant's conduct, receiving child pornography, was a "substantial factor in causing the
ultimate loss"); Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *5 (noting that proximate cause only requires that
the defendant's conduct be a substantial factor in the victim's harm; this requirement does not
mean that it needs to be the greatest or sole cause of the harm).
110. Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *5.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *6.
113. Id
114. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 12, 2010), aff'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150,
2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009); see also United States v. Staples, No.
09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (holding the defendant jointly
and severally liable based on the statutory language of § 2259, without discussing the issue of
proximate causation).
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trauma.',11 Likewise, in United States v. Hicks, the court concluded that the
defendant's act of seeking images depicting the victim's abuse served as a
"sufficiently proximate tie to her ongoing injuries." 1l6 Notwithstanding the
approach used, all awarding courts conclude that each individual possession of
child pomography is a proximate cause of the victim's harm.117
b. Calculating an Award ofRestitution
Upon a finding of proximate causation, awarding courts must calculate the
now-mandatory monetary award under § 2259.18 This endeavor is admittedly
difficult.119 Although united in finding proximate cause, awarding courts
compute restitution in a variety of ways.
Two district courts in Florida granted restitution awards of over $3 million
dollars.121 In United States v. Staples, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida awarded $3,680,153, the full amount of restitution
requested, and held the defendant jointly and severally liable with future
defendants.122 The court explained that because § 2259 applies to the crime of
possession and uses the word "shall," language that is explicit, not precatory,
the defendant must pay restitution to Amy, the victim of his crime.123
Most awarding courts have not granted full requests, but instead have
granted reduced awards by focusing on the defendant's conduct, establishing a
115. Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *2. The defendant possessed over 1000 images of child
pornography, which included at least one image each of Amy and Vicky. Id at *1. The
defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography in violation of both
§2252 and § 2256. Id.
116. Hicks, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4. Among other materials, the defendant possessed two
images and two videos depicting Vicky on his computer. Id. at * 1. The defendant pleaded guilty
under § 2252A(b)(1) for the attempted receipt of child pornography. Id.
117. See Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *6 ("Each possessor of Amy's images constitutes an
individual who has caused [her] harm . . . ."); Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 ("Defendant's
conduct [receiving and possessing pornography of Vicky and Amy] was a proximate cause of
both Vicky's and [Amy]'s injury.").
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006).
119. See Hicks, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (noting that ascertaining the specific harm caused
by the defendant's conduct is "highly interrelated with the issue of defining 'victim,"' thus
making the determination ofa specific restitution amount an "admittedly ... difficult task under
[§ 2259]").
120. See, e.g., Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (employing the apportionment technique to
award $1500 for Vicky and $6000 for Amy); United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009
WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (awarding the full restitution amount and holding
the defendant jointly and severally liable); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08
-CR-0365, 2009 WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (balancing Congress's punitive
intent with the defendant's due process rights in awarding restitution in the amount of $3,000).
121. See Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4; Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case at 8
United States v. Freeman, No. 3:08-cr-22-002, at *8 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2009) (order amending
judgment) (entering a restitution order against the defendant for $3,263,758).
122. Staples, 2009 WL 282724, at *3-4.
123. Id. at *2-3.
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set award, or using apportionment. 124 In Aumais, the district court aimed to
distinguish the harm caused by the defendant's conduct from the harm that
resulted from the original abuse.125 The court assessed the government's
request for $3,367,173 in restitution to Amy and found that this figure reflected
both the harm caused by her uncle and that caused by consumers.126
Regarding this as improper conflation, the court focused only on the harm
resulting from the defendant's personal conduct.127 Although the evidence did
not indicate a causal link between her unemployment and the defendant's
possession,128 the evidence established that Amy would need future counseling
sessions as a result of the defendant's possession.1 29 However, in calculating a
restitution award of $48,483, the court limited the frequency of counseling
sessions and the time frame for which it held the defendant financially
liable. 130 Considering that the language of § 2259 instructs the defendant to
pay "the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court," the
court declined to award an apportioned amount and entered the full sum
against the defendant.131
Some district courts avoid calculation issues altogether by setting a standard
amount.132 For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California requires each defendant convicted of possessing child
pornography to pay the victim $3000 in restitution.133 To reach this amount,
124. See United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *7-9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
13, 2010) (calculating an award of $48,483 to Amy because the defendant was "responsible for
exacerbating a pre-existing condition"); Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (awarding $1500 for
Vicky and $6000 for Amy, both significantly less than the requested amounts, because the
defendant only possessed the images without having any contact with the victims); Monk, 2009
WL 2567831, at *5-6 (awarding $3000 each to Vicky and Amy by apportioning liability).
125. Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *7.
126. Id To reach the full amount requested, the government attributed $2,855,173 to lost
wages and $512,681 to the expense of future counseling. Id.
127. Id. at *7-8.
128. Id. (noting that the court would have to make "major assumptions to connect the harm
resulting from possession . . . to [Amy's] inability to maintain employment").
129. Id. at *8.
130. Id. at *8-9. The court recognized that any determination of expenses for counseling
would involve an inevitable fusion of the original and exacerbated harm. Id at *8. The court
refused to calculate lifelong counseling expenses because it would require "substantial
speculation" about Amy's future. Id. Instead, the court found it reasonable to provide Amy
restitution for five years of weekly counseling and an additional five years of monthly counseling.
Id.
131. Id. at *9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added)).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 2:08-cr-01435, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 113942, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2009) (order entering judgment and defining terms of probation and
commitment) (ordering $5000 in restitution); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365, 2009
WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (ordering $3000 in restitution).
133. United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293, 2010 WL 144837, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
11, 2010); United States v. Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
19, 2009); United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
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the court looked to § 2255, which establishes civil remedies for a victim's
personal injury. 134  Under this provision, victims are "deemed to have
sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value."' 35 However, because
§ 2255 incorporates crimes ranging from sexual engagement to sex trafficking,
the court inferred that Congress did not intend to award such a significant
amount for the comparably lesser crime of possession.' 36 Therefore, the court
concluded that $3000, although only two percent of the $150,000 statutory
minimum, was suitable in each case; a lower amount would not properly
compensate the victim for his or her losses, but a higher amount would present
issues involving the defendant's due process rights.l 7
Other courts strive to determine a proper restitution amount for the victim by
apportioning liability. In United States v. Hicks, the court used
apportionment to evaluate the appropriateness of the award for Vicky and
found $3000 to be sufficient.1 3 9 Due to the large volume of Vicky's images
accessible on the Internet, the court believed that at least fifty individuals
would be convicted for the possession of Vicky's images. The court
reasoned that if Vicky received $3000 in restitution from at least fifty
individuals, the aggregate sum would total her original request and fully
compensate her for her harm. 141
Similarly, in United States v. Brunner, the court concluded that
"apportioning a discrete amount of the victims' losses to Defendant is in the
interests of justice."l 42 Although finding Vicky and Amy's full amount of lost
earnings and counseling expenses to be legitimate, the court concluded that the
19, 2009); Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, at *5; United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369, 2009 WL
2567832, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009).
134. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, at *4-5 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). The court referred to
the calculation as a "legal quandary" due to the difficulty in quantifying the losses. Id at *4.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The court viewed this sum as Congress's determination of the
proper restitution awards for Title 18 crimes. Monk, 2009 WL 256731, at *5. Further, the court
noted that a victim only needs to demonstrate that he or she has suffered a personal injury to
receive restitution; proof of the exact amount of damages caused by the defendant is not required.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. However, the court also acknowledged that $3000 is "somewhat less than the actual
harm this particular defendant caused each victim." Id
138. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 12, 2010) (determining that, in cases of child pornography possession, apportioning the
defendant's share of the restitution is appropriate because more than one defendant contributed to
the victim's loss), af'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150,
2009 WL 4110260, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (discussing the practicalities of apportioning
restitution).
139. Hicks, 2009 WL 4110260, at *6.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (reasoning that the defendant's relatively minor
contribution to the victims' injuries made it proper to apportion the restitution award).
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defendant's personal level of contribution only amounted to $1500 for Vicky
and $6000 for Amy.143 The court explained that those amounts represented a
"roughly equal fraction" of the individual victims' projected therapy costs and
lost income in relation to the defendant's personal contribution to the victims'
injuries.144 Additionally, the court emphasized that the crime in this case was
"mere possession" of child pornography; the defendant had never been in
actual contact with the victims.145 Thus, the court opined that the restitution
amounts awarded by other courts "overvalued" the amount each defendant
owed because those courts "failed to recognize that the most substantial cause
of [their] loss was the initial abuse."l 46
The Ninth Circuit upheld a similar decision and, after finding both causation
and appropriate restitution, awarded Vicky $3000.147 The circuit court
concluded that the government had satisfied its burden of establishing
proximate causation on forseeability grounds. 148  The court upheld the
restitution award because it found that the amount would cover the cost of one
and one-half years of therapy, which "seem[ed] to be more than fair and
reasonable."' 4
II. THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POSSESSION,
CAUSATION, AND RESTITUTION
The possession of child pornography undoubtedly harms the depicted
victim.1o However, the possessor's role in contributing to the victim's harm
muddles § 2259's clear mandate of restitution.' 51 Awarding courts approach
this dilemma from a theoretical perspective by focusing on the individual
possessor's role.152 This Part demonstrates why this rationale prevails153 and
143. Id at *3-4 (determining that the government had proven Vicky and Amy's losses by a
preponderance of the evidence).
144. Id at *4.
145. Id. (explaining the rationale behind the court's relatively low restitution determinations).
146. Id
147. United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App'x 377, 378 (9th Cir. 2010).
148. Id at 379.
149. Id
150. See, e.g., United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ("There
is no doubt that everyone involved with child pornography-from the abusers and producers to
the end-users and possessors--contribute to [the victim's] ongoing harm."), mandamus denied
sub nom., In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd on reh'g sub nom., In re Amy
Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at
*4-5 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (describing the difficulty in determining proximate causation in
child pornography restitution cases when the defendant and countless others have contributed to
the victim's harm).
152. See infra Part II.A.
153. See infra Part II.A-B.
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then addresses the workable and unworkable aspects of awarding courts'
techniques for calculating victim restitution.
A. The Theoretical Lens: The Individual's Role
Awarding courts view the crime of possessing child pornography through
the theoretical lens of consumerism, analyzing such conduct in the larger
context of the child pornography market. 154  These courts emphasize the
uncontroverted determination that the dissemination of child pornography
harms the depicted victim.' Additionally, awarding courts believe that the
transmission of these images over the Internet perpetuates the victims' abuse,
invades their privacy, and provides an economic incentive for the further
creation of child pornography.156 Under this perspective, the child's
victimization "flows just as directly" from a defendant's knowing possession
as it does from the production and dissemination of pornographic materials. 1 57
Awarding courts state that the individuals comprising the online
child-pornography market fuel this harmful circulation.158  The individual
possessor of the materials participates as a consumer of the market's "product"
and, as a result, is an active participant in a system that perpetuates the
injurious digital circulation.15 9  Each individual possession re-victimizes the
154. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.l (1982) ("[C]hild pornography and child
prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a
nationwide scale." (quoting S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,
42). Congress found that "[a] substantial interstate market in child pornography exists, including
... a nationwide network of individuals openly advertising their desire to exploit children and to
traffic in child pornography. Many of these individuals distribute child pornography with the
expectation of receiving other child pornography in return." Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120 Stat. 587, 623.
155. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (declaring that "the use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the
child").
156. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1998) (outlining the
various harms cased by the consumer, or "end recipient," of internet child pornography).
157. Id. at 930.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(concluding that although the circulation of images might occur regardless of the defendant's
possession, his individual participation in such circulation proximately caused the victim's harm).
The demand for images results partly from the "process of desensitization" where possessors
desire a greater degree of explicit photography to maintain the thrill incited by the material.
SHARON W. COOPER ET AL., MEDICAL, LEGAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE ASPECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION 199 (Karen C. Maurer et al. eds., 2005). Furthermore, the ability of a possessor to
exchange and share images with another offender provides "validation" for his collection efforts.
See LANNING, supra note 7, at 30.
159. See, e.g., Norris, 159 F.3d at 929-30; see also United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-71 1,
2010 WL 3033821, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010) (finding that as long as the defendant's
possession of the images "caused substantial harm to [the victim], proximate cause [could be
found] even if the conduct of others similar to that of [the defendant] caused equal or greater
harm").
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victim and contributes to his or her harm. 1o Under this rationale, awarding
courts conclude that each individual possessor's participation in the market is a
proximate cause of the victim's harm. 161
Awarding courts reject arguments opposing a finding of proximate cause by
offering responses based on this market ideology. 16  One such opposing
argument points to the incalculable number of persons who have possessed or
will possess the same images that the defendant obtained.13 Because each
possessor personally contributes to the victim's harm, awarding courts counter
this assertion by arguing that such harm cannot be "obviated or diminished by
the fact that others also possessed the images." 64 Another argument against
proximate causation is the victim's lack of actual knowledge of the details
involved in each defendant's case.s However, awarding courts emphasize
that the victim's awareness, or lack thereof, does not alter the existence of the
harm caused. 166
In contrast to the market ideology employed by awarding courts, declining
courts view a defendant's crime of possession through an individualistic
lens. Instead of equating consumerism with proximate causation, declining
courts strive to determine the precise portion of the victim's harm caused by a
particular defendant's possession.16 As a result, declining courts and
awarding courts arrive at contradictory conclusions when presented with
similar facts.169
Declining courts regard the inconceivable number of possessors as a
significant obstacle to a determination of proximate causation.170 Because a
160. See Aumais, 2010 WL 303382, at *6 (noting that victims whose abuse is recorded "can
never regard their victimization as terminated" because each future possessor will harm the
victim).
161. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing the finding by some courts that mere participation in
the internet child pornography market suffices to find proximate cause, while other courts require
a "substantial" contribution to the victim's harm).
162. See, e.g., Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *6.
163. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
164. Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *6.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
166. See, e.g., Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *6 (stating that although the victim had no
direct awareness of that defendant, his possession of the victim's images caused her harm because
the victim knew of the exploitation of her images by a group of consumers, one of whom
happened to be the defendant). Furthermore, Amy and Vicky's victim-impact statements
illuminate their consciousness of individual possessors. See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 7, 2009) (explaining that the court must be able to ascertain a specific harm caused by the
defendant's individual act).
168. See supra Part I.C.I.
169. Compare supra Part I.C.1, with Part I.C.2 (discussing the disparate findings of awarding
and declining courts despite nearly identical facts).
170. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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victim's harm is a product of indistinguishable accumulation, declining courts
conclude that a victim's general trauma concerning the circulation of his or her
images would exist regardless of whether an individual defendant downloaded
the materials.' 7 1 To bolster this point, declining courts emphasize the victim's
ignorance of the particular defendant in the casel 72 and that the victims do not
pursue additional support upon learning of that particular defendant's
possession. Because the victims did not know of the individual defendant or
his criminal acts, declining courts assert that their harm would continue
regardless of the defendant's conduct.174
As applied to proximate causation, declining courts' individualized approach
is flawed in several ways. The most significant flaw is the courts' failure to
fully comply with § 2259, which mandates that district courts order restitution
for offenses under Chapter 110, including the crime of possession of child
pornography.s75  Despite universal recognition that the crime of possession
causes harm to the depicted child,176 declining courts do not hold guilty
defendants financially accountable for their individual possessions. 7 7  If all
courts adopted this individualized approach, the crime of possession would be
effectively exempt from the statute's mandate. 78  Defendants in these cases
171. See, e.g., United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2010); United
States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D. Me. 2009) ("Before this Defendant viewed their
images, the Victims had suffered all of the losses established by the evidence . . . . Their 'prior
state of well-being' had already been inalterably damaged both by the initial abuse and by the
idea that other individuals were viewing their images on a continuing basis." (quoting S. REP. No.
104-179, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 926).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
173. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) (2006).
176. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 90.
178. See In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 797 (5th Cir. 2009) (Dennis, J., dissenting) ("Congress
intended to afford child victims ample and generous protection and restitution, not to invite judge-
made limitations patently at odds with the purpose of the legislation. Under the district court's
analysis, the intent and purposes of § 2259 would be impermissibility nullified . . . ."); see also
William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 433-34 (1937)
(describing, in the context of tort law, the concurrent causation of a single, indivisible result). In
tort law, the concept of concurrent causation of an individual result lends fair support for the
proposition of awarding courts:
In such cases [in which two or more individuals contribute to an indivisible result] it is
clear that each defendant is in fact responsible for the single result, which cannot be
apportioned; it is also clear that neither [of the concurrent actors] can be absolved from
liability upon the ground that the injury would have happened without him, or there
will be no recovery at all. Each defendant must be liable if his act was a material and
substantial factor in producing the result, even though he was not essential to it.
Prosser, supra, at 434. This theory mirrors the awarding courts' conclusion that because
possessors are a substantial cause of a victim's harm, they should be liable, to some degree, for a
victim's continuing injuries. For a further discussion of tort law concepts analogized to the crime
1132 [Vol. 60: 1
2011] Restitution for the Victims ofPossession of Child Pornography
would then be protected from restitution claims, and victims would be left
without the remedy that Congress intended to provide for them. 179
Furthermore, by refusing to award restitution, declining courts improperly
consider whether a defendant should be required to pay restitution-a decision
that has already been pre-determined by the legislature. so In United States v.
Paroline, for example, the court asserted that "[a] victim is not necessarily
entitled to restitution for all of her losses simply because the victim was
harmed and sustained some lesser loss as a result of a defendant's specific
conduct."18' The plain language of § 2259 requires the "full amount" of losses
to be awarded in restitution and says nothing about a comparative analysis of
individualized losses caused by the defendant versus general losses to the
victim. 182
The awarding courts' approach best reconciles congressional intent with the
reality that an individual consumer of Internet child pornography contributes to
the victim's harm. 183 Amy and Vicky give weight to this rationale in their
victim-impact statements by expressing that the simple knowledge that an
individual is or will be viewing images of their abuse causes anxiety.184
Although awarding courts admittedly struggle with an appropriate calculation
of restitution, declining courts strive not to find proximate causation because
such a finding would require them to quantify a generalized harm on an
individualized basis. 85 Although this daunting task is a concern of merit, it is
of Internet child pornography tort analogies, see United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597,
612-13 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
179. Cf Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15; see also United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09
-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) ("[T]he Court declines to refuse
§ 2259's mandate-as several other districts have recently done-by selectively reading § 2259
to obfuscate its apparent intent 'to pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes."'
(quoting United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah 2004))).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (finding
that § 2259 requires restitution once proximate cause has been found between the defendant's
actions and the victim's harm), mandamus denied sub nom., In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792 (5th Cir.
2009), rev'don reh g sub nom., In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011).
18 1. Id
182. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2006); see also United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-711, 2010
WL 3033821, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010) ("[I]f the harm caused by [the defendant's]
possession of [the victim's] images caused substantial harm to [the victim], proximate cause has
been demonstrated even if the conduct of others similar to that of [the defendant] caused equal or
greater harm.").
183. See, e.g., Aumais, 2010 WL 3033821, at *4-5 (noting Congress's intent to fully
compensate victims of defendants who proximately cause their harm).
184. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
185. See In re Amy, 591 F.3d at 796-97 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Schwartz, supra
note 8, at A19 (quoting the assistant attorney general for the criminal division of the Department
of Justice, who "urge[s] judges not to let 'practical and administrative challenges' to the
restitution issue 'drive a policy position that directly or indirectly suggests that possession of
child pornography is a victimless crime').
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misplaced in a discussion of proximate causation rather than in the calculation
of restitution.186
B. The Calculation ofRestitution: The Lost Sight of the Individual
Under § 2259, the court must order the defendant to "pay the
victim . . . the full amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court."l 87
Procedurally, "[i]f the court finds that more than [one] defendant has
contributed to the loss . . . the court may make each defendant liable for
payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the
defendants to reflect the[ir] level of contribution."
In executing these provisions, awarding courts engage in various methods of
restitution calculation. 189 The most controversial and infrequent approach is to
award the full restitution request; under this approach, courts have held
defendants jointly and severally liable for an award of over $3 million.1 90 This
system has several shortcomings. First, each district only has control over the
defendants within its jurisdiction.1 91  Therefore, courts cannot apportion
liability to defendants outside their jurisdiction, 192 which forces the defendant
to seek contribution from defendants convicted in other jurisdictions to avoid
paying more than his fair share or pay the entire request himself 193 Even if
cross-jurisdictional enforcement were possible, this mechanism would still
falter because the "crime of child pornography is a collaborative victimization
that is on-going," which makes it "impossible to make a proportionate division
of the restitution amount among an unknown number of unidentified future
186. Cf United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov.
24, 2009) ("That such a showing [of harm] is difficult ... does not relieve this Court of its duty to
comply with the statutory command of § 2259.").
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1).
188. Id. § 3664(h).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 12, 2010) (employing the apportionment technique and awarding $1500 for Vicky and $6000
for Amy), aff'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365,
2009 WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (establishing a set award of $3000 each
victim); United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
2, 2009) (awarding the full restitution amount to the victim and holding the defendant jointly and
severally liable).
190. See Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4.
191. Brief of The National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. in Support of Restitution for
Amy and Other Victims of Child Pornography at 20, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d
781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61) [hereinafter Brief of the NCVLI].
192. See id. (noting that "in the context of multiple defendants across jurisdictions a court
cannot . . . apportion restitution" because it would be impossible to determine each defendant's
share).
193. See id.; 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 10 (2004) (noting that where a party has paid
more than his share for a common burden, an action for contribution from other parties is
appropriate).
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defendants."' 94 Furthermore, the purpose of restitution is to equalize the harm
caused, as to "make the victim whole while the Sentencing Guidelines serve a
punitive purpose."' 95  Thus, the imposition of the full award embodies the
concern of declining courts that the defendants will be held responsible for "all
losses resulting from all acts by all abusers." 96
Second, courts that grant a fixed award may possibly undervalue an
individual's contribution to the victim's harm by failing to give proper regard
to the underlying facts of the individual defendant's case.' For example, a
defendant who possesses a complete series of child pornography could be
ordered to pay restitution in the same amount as an individual who possessed
only one, less explicit image.' 98 Although a victim may ultimately recover
restitution from multiple possessors to cover her full losses, due process
requires that each defendant receive an individual consideration when
determining the proper restitution amount.199 Despite this possible pitfall, the
consideration of § 2255(a) and the usage of a small percentage of the potential
statutor27 amount is a notable tactical approach to calculating the restitution
award.
One district court concluded that "the interests of justice" require the
apportionment of a "discrete amount of the victims' losses" to the defendant,
especially because the crime at issue involved "mere possession" rather than
194. Brief of the NCVLI, supra note 191, at 20.
195. United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
19, 2009) (quoting United States v. Crandall, 525 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2008)).
196. United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 17, 2009). From a practical standpoint, it may be useful for courts to consider the
defendant's assets when victims seek large restitution awards. Otherwise, a defendant may be
forced to declare bankruptcy because the statute instructs the court not to consider the defendant's
economic circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (b)(4)(B)(1) (2006) (requiring the court to issue
an order of restitution notwithstanding the economic circumstances of the defendant). As a result,
the victim would be unable to fully collect her award.
197. See, e.g., Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, at *56 (finding a restitution amount of$3000 as
appropriate for the victim, which was determined by calculating a percentage of the amount
suggested by the statute that the court believed would compensate the victim for her harm without
threatening the defendant's due process rights); United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-cr-0369, 2009
WL 2567832, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (granting both victims $3000 based on the same
reasoning as Renga). These opinions do not discuss the underlying facts of each individual
defendant, but simply suggest that the defendants possessed images depicting the victim or
victims now requesting restitution. See, e.g., Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, at *1; Zane, 2009 WL
2567832, at *1.
198. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2259(a)(b)(1) (stating that a defendant found guilty of any offense
under Chapter 110 is liable for the full amount of the victim's harm without regard to
egregiousness).
199. See Brief of the NVCLI, supra note 191, at 15-16; see also supra Part LA (discussing
the equalizing function of restitution).
200. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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production or distribution of the images. 201 The apportionment approach has
resulted in restitution amounts ranging from $1500 to $6000. Another
district court determined what it believed to be an appropriate restitution
amount by calculating the cost of counseling that could be fairly attributed to
the defendant's possession.203 The court relied on this method of calculation
by focusing on § 2259's instruction that the "full amount" of the losses should
204be awarded. However, such an award seems to exaggerate the harm caused
by a particular defendant's possession.205
Although aspects of these techniques may be useful in some respects, there
is a complete lack of uniformity among courts. Courts need a technique that
considers the individual defendant as separate from both the original abuse and
acts of all other possessors, and that evaluates the fact-specific aspects of each
particular defendant's case.
III. RECONCILIATION: BALANCING THE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO RESTITUTION WITH
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A REFLECTIVE AWARD
Restitution is meant to accelerate rehabilitation, facilitate retribution, and
further deter the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography. 206
American jurisprudence and legislation recognize the harms that victims
endure not only at the hands of their abusers, but also by the multitudes of
207 208possessors. Section 2259 epitomizes this consciousness. In light of the
general purpose of restitution and the harmful effects that victims experience,
the awarding courts' consumerism analyses, which establish the finding of
proximate causation for every individual possessor based on participation in
the child-pornography market, is the most legally effective approach to both
determining perpetual crime and compensating the traumatized victims.209
However, when calculating the proper restitution amount, the declining courts'
201. United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-cr-16, 2010 WL 4110260, at *6 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 12,
2010), aff'd, 393 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2010).
202. See id at *4 (awarding $1500 to Vicky and $6000 to Amy); United States v. Monk, No.
08-CR-0365, 2009 WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (awarding $3000 to Vicky).
203. United States v. Aumais, No. 08-cr-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *8-9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2010).
204. Id. at *9 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2006)).
205. See Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (concluding that some courts have overvalued
awards by failing to keep the victim's physical abuse, for which the defendant was not directly
responsible, in mind).
206. See supra Part I.A.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009),
mandamus denied sub nom., In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2009), rev d on reh'g sub nom., In
re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 624 (declaring that a
graphic depiction constitutes a "repetition of their abuse").
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259; supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
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individualistic approach must prevail. Because retribution requires an offender
to pay for the injustices inflicted upon the victim, courts must strive to measure
the offenses caused by a singular possessor.210
Section 2259 instructs that the defendant must "pay the victim . . . the full
amount of the victim's losses as determined by the court,"2 11 with such losses
being those proximately caused by the defendant's illegal conduct.212 To
determine the "full" amount of harm to a victim proximately caused by the
actions of a defendant, courts should engage in a fact-based inquiry, such as
evaluating the number of material items possessed, the nature of the images,
213and the method of downloading the materials. Possession of even one image
of a child that exhibits partial nudity (as opposed to graphic conduct)
constitutes a specific invasion of privacy that revictimizes the depicted child
with each viewing.214 Therefore, an analysis must be structured to evaluate
how the defendant's conduct aggravates this base harm to the victim, as
opposed to allowing the defendant's harm to be subsumed into the general
harm caused by the availability of the victim's images on the Internet.
In embarking on this fact-based inquiry, courts should begin by determining
the quantity of materials depicting the victim that the defendant possesses.
210. See Brief of the NCVLI, supra note 191, at 16 (noting that although an individualized
inquiry "may not be the most efficient way to proceed, a defendant's due process rights arguably
dictate this result").
211. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (emphasis added).
212. See id. § 2259(b)(3); In re Amy, 591 F. 3d at 794-95 (upholding a district court
decision finding a proximate causation requirement within § 2259); United States v. Doe, 488
F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating a willingness to uphold an award of restitution under
§ 2259 as long as proximate cause could be established and the victim's harm could be
estimated).
213. See United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795-96 (D.N.D. 2010) (conducting
a fact-specific analysis of proximate cause). The Solsbury court focused on whether the
defendant distributed or produced the images, contributed to blogs or chat rooms, or attempted to
contact the victim. Id. at 796. The court also noted that there was no evidence showing that the
defendant actually viewed the downloaded materials and that the victim's psychological reports
did not specifically discuss the defendant. Id. Although this court laudably introduced a
fact-specific method of evaluating proximate causation, several of its factors are irrelevant. First,
the charged offense is knowing possession, which renders his lack of production, distribution, and
contact with the victim immaterial, as those are separate criminal offenses. Furthermore,
evidence that the defendant actually viewed the images is unnecessary to prove knowing
possession. Obtaining images from a peer-to-peer network requires an active search of terms and
intentional download of the materials. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2,
at 9-10. Thus, under these circumstances, possession may be considered a "knowing" action.
Although establishing an analytical framework is a progressive step toward accurately
determining an individual defendant's culpability, the factors used must be relevant.
214. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120
Stat. 587, 624 (finding that "[e]very instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a
renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse").
215. See Robert M. Sieg, Attempted Possession of Child Pornography-A Proposed
Approach for Criminalizing Possession of Child Pornographic Images of Unknown Origin, 36 U.
TOL. L. REV. 263, 270 (2005) (noting that the quantity of pornographic images possessed is a
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A complete pornographic series or a multiplicity of images augments the
possessor's gratification.216  The offender views the victim's exposure to a
greater extent, which intensifies the victim's harm by further invading her
privacy and thereby revictimizing her.217
The court should also review the degree of explicitness displayed in the
materials.218 Because viewing child pornography is comparable to observing
the initial abuse as it happens,219 the content of an image is a relevant
consideration, as it determines what the offender was viewing. Though the
victim is harmed by possession regardless of the explicitness of the content, an
offender's enjoyment of highly abusive and graphic images should weigh more
heavily in measuring the harm caused by the defendant. 0
Finally, courts should consider the means by which the defendant acquired
the materials.221 Compared to storing images in isolation on a harddrive,
factor in evaluating attempted possession claims). But see Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making the
Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for the Federal
Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 41 (2010). Noting that
federal sentencing guidelines provide for harsher punishments based on the quantity of child
pornography possessed, Exum argues that it is "unclear how having 150 to 300 images stored on
an offender's computer necessarily makes that an offender more deviant than an offender who has
10 to 150 images stored on his computer." Id at 40. Exum emphasizes the relative ease of
obtaining large quantities of illegal images by "push[ing] a few buttons on a computer," as
contrasted to ordering materials by mail. Id. at 41. Exum's arguments may be relevant when
considering an individual's deviancy for the purposes of sentencing or may be powerful rationales
for revising the federal guidelines to reflect the modern role of technology in the commission of
crimes; however, when evaluating the harm inflicted upon a depicted child, the number of
possessed images should be a factor. Given that possession of a singular image harms the child,
the possession of an entire "series" depicting the victim certainly compounds the initial harm.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216. See TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 3, at 161 (indicating that the complete series has a
greater "potential for increasing the capacity to create sexual arousal").
217. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218. See TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 3, at 31-37 (describing the COPINE scale-a
grading system consisting of ten levels, ranging from "indicative" to "sadistic/bestiality," which
is used to determine the severity of an image of child pornography). The degree of severity is
determined by the context and "the way in which [the photographs] are organised, or stored, or
the principal themes illustrated." Id at 33.
219. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 10A.
220. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1982) (noting that imposing severe
criminal penalties for possession materials would likely lower the demand for those materials,
resulting in decreased production and therefore fewer available images of child sexual abuse).
Several of these factors may clash depending on the facts of the case. The judiciary, however, is
certainly capable of weighing various factors within a fact-specific analytical structure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (D.N.D. 2010) (applying a fact-specific
analysis to determine whether an internet child pornography possessor's contribution proximately
caused a victim's harm).
221. Exum, supra note 215, at 41 (noting that stricter sentences may be applicable to
offenders who procure child pornography using "non-computer" means). Such stricter sentences
may also be applicable to those who contribute to the proliferation of child pornography via
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downloading images from a peer-to-peer network, which makes these images
available to other users, passively fosters the circulation of such images by
virtue of possession.222
Although these considerations will aid courts in determining the degree to
which the defendant's conduct aggravated a victim's harm, they do not
necessarily aid courts in translating the aggravated harm into a fixed monetary
quantity. Without guiding pecuniary metrics, even courts that have awarded
restitution have been unable to agree on the proper method of calculating the
amount of harm proximately caused by each defendant, thus producing widely
divergent results.223  Legislation would effectively resolve this "calculation
quandary." 224
For example, Congress could choose to establish a minimum and maximum
percentage of the total amount of the victim's losses to be available as
225restitution. The presiding judge would have discretion in determining
whether to impose the minimum or maximum award or an intermediate
peer-to-peer networks. The increasing popularity of peer-to-peer networks presents a particular
danger to society in this context, as newer "decentralized" networks do not require outside parties
to monitor users or files. See id. at 11,17. Thus, Congress or the courts may wish to apply stiffer
penalties to offenders who possess and share files via such interlaced networks to counterbalance
the unique risks associated with this avenue of access and distribution.
222. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 15. Although these
interactive networks enable effortless access to child pornography in essentially the same manner
as websites, their most dangerous feature in this context is making child pornography increasingly
accessible. See id. at 15-19 (explaining how peer-to-peer networks allow users to easily
communicate with each other to transmit and receive requested information). Thus, peer-to-peer
networks amplify spread of child pornography files. See id. at 9-10. But see United States v.
Schaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an individual "distributes" child
pornography by allowing other users to download the materials that were accessible to others on a
peer-to-peer network). The Tenth Circuit analogized downloading images from a peer-to-peer
network to getting gas from a self-serve gas station, noting that the owners of the gas station may
not be present when gas is pumped, but they nonetheless make their product accessible. Id.
223. See supra Part I.C.2 (noting that restitution awards have ranged from $1500 to over $3
million).
224. See Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 796 (asserting that the problem of determining
appropriate guidelines for imposing restitution in possession cases is "one best left for Congress
to resolve"). The court calls for an "appropriate restitution remedy" for the "conflicting and
inconsistent awards and decisions [that] have evolved." Id. at 797.
225. Cf id. at 796 n.1 (proposing that Congress should define minimum and maximum
awards based on the severity of the offense). In a separate series of cases, the Eastern District of
California employed a "percentage approach," which calculated the appropriate award as $3000,
two percent of the statutory $150,000 minimum provided for in § 2255. See supra text
accompanying notes 132-37. Although the court did not fully explain its rationale for choosing
to use a percentage of the total possible award, the amount of $3000 seems to serve the
comprehensive goal of apportioning only a discrete amount of the losses to the defendant. See
supra text accompanying notes 132-37. Rather than taking a percentage of the civil damages
minimum, this Comment proposes that calculations should be derived from a congressionally
determined minimum and maximum percentage of the victim's requested damages.
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amount derived from a fact-based inquiry.226 This system would ensure
consistency while allowing the restitution award to fluctuate within established
boundaries, depending on the severity of the defendant's conduct and the
ensuing aggravation of the victim's harm. Thus, the proposed analytical
structure would rehabilitate the victim by ordering the offender to offset the
harm caused by the defendant's personal conduct in accordance with the
underlying purposes of criminal restitution.227
IV. CONCLUSION
The Internet has transformed the market of child pornography, necessitating
that the law evolve to address this transformation with respect to the Internet's
virtual intricacies. The judiciary must apply § 2259 in accordance with the
prevailing theory that each possessor of child pornography participates in the
market and thereby substantially contributes to the victim's harm. The
legislature must also address this novel legal issue. Once courts make a
finding of proximate causation, they encounter the seemingly impossible task
of first quantifying a continuing harm and then apportioning that harm amongst
an uncertain, fluctuating number of possessors with varying degrees of
liability. Although a fact-specific analysis may aid courts in determining the
appropriate portion of the victim's harm allocable to an individual defendant,
there ultimately must be legislatively established monetary limits to curb the
currently unbridled judicial discretion.
The harm that victims of the possession of child pornography suffer is
perpetual. Although money may never make the victim whole, restitution may
make the healing process economically feasible. Each victim deserves the
legislatively designated award of restitution from each possessor, and each
possessor deserves to pay only the amount that reflects the severity of his or
her crime. The proximate causation requirement and the fused calculative
approach of a factual inquiry and legislative limits will hopefully strike this
226. Yet, the unique, enduring nature of child pornography and the inconceivable
amalgamation of possessors make an accurate evaluation of harm caused by a particular
defendant almost impossible. See supra text accompanying note 194. In light of the unworkable
"restitution provision" of § 2259, one court suggested that Congress consider the establishment of
a compensation fund for victims or a fine schedule. See Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 790 n. .
Other nations, such as Australia, have established general compensation funds. See Directory of
International Crime Victim Compensation Programs 2004-2005, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/intdir2005/australia
.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2011). Alternatively, Congress could simply define the permissible
range of monetary damages. Though not in the context of criminal restitution, Congress has
previously established a collectable monetary sum for other offenses with harms that are difficult
to quantify. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)-(c) (2006) (setting forth offense-based levels of civil
damages for those whose "wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed or
intentionally used").
227. See supra text accompanying note 41 (stating that rehabilitation, retribution, and
deterrence are the primary purposes of restitution).
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balance by addressing the alarming lack of uniformity and fairness in these
cases.
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